Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report. The War Inquiry Commission was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December In its secret report, never. Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report The War Inquiry Commission was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December In its secret report, never. Hamoodur Rahman Commission is probably the only postwar inquiry commission authorized by the Pakistani government that inquired and submitted report on.
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They had seen their comrades insulted, deprived of food and ration, and even killed without rhyme or reason. An explanation was called rahjan the Commanding Officer, Brigadier, Saghir Hussain and he has denied the allegation stating that all the personnel, barring a few who had either deserted or did not return from leave, were safely evacuated to West Pakistan under arrangements of Eastern Command, and they were later repatriated to Bangladesh along with other East Pakistani personnel.
After examining witnesses, we submitted the Main Report in July, Dahman report accused the army generals of reportt it called a “premature surrender” and said the military’s continued involvement in running the government after was one reason for the corruption and ineffectiveness of senior officers. Bhutto, which resulted in the separation of East Pakistan.
No amount of provocation by the militants of the Awami League or other miscreants could justify retaliation by a disciplined army against its own people.
Hamoodur Rahman Commission – Wikipedia
Barguna Bhimnali Ketnar Bil Suryamani. It has also to be said that both ckmmission Generals had issued repeated warnings to troops to refrain from acts of violence and immorality. In the Report the Commission had observed that its findings with regard to the causes of surrender in East Pakistan were only tentative.
Story of Pakistan reports. The Role of Maj.
Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report – Wikipedia
We wish to supplement those observations as regards Lt. In the meantime a number of questionnaires were issued to various persons, including rahmann who were at the helm of affairs in East Pakistan, at the relevant time and others whom we considered likely to have relevant knowledge. Mohammad Ashraf Witness No. Excessive force was used on that night.
Hamoodur Rahman Commission report unsettles Pakistan, raises demands for probe into Kargil
Bhutto replied that the report was missing; it was either lost, or stolen, and was nowhere to be found. Malik and his ministers were figureheads only. He did so with a view to obtaining personal power and those who assisted him did so with full knowledge of reporf intentions.
An all-out war had, therefore, become reportt for India, and in such an event the only course open for Pakistan was to implement the traditional concept of defending East Pakistan from West Pakistan in an determined and effective manner.
The Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report | A Review
Accordingly, we stated that “our observations and conclusions regarding the surrender in East Pakistan and other allied matters should be regarded as provisional and subject to modification in the light of the evidence of the Commander, Eastern Command, and other senior officers as and when such evidence becomes available.
Finally, we have observed that during his period of captivity at Jabbalpur India Lt General Niazi made efforts to persuade, by threats and inducements, his subordinate Commanders to present a coordinated story so as to mitigate his responsibility for the debate.
Immense human rights violations were being reported by international organizations such as Amnesty International and Asia Watch with reference to the role of Indian Security Forces in the Indian-held Kashmir.
In these circumstances, these newly elected representatives did not have any authority to speak on behalf of the people. A Global Studies Handbook. The wisest course of action for Gen. There should be no difficulty in reconstructing the record, if necessary as the material witness appear to be now available in Pakistan.
Others added their own list of army misdemeanours. Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if necessary by the use of force. Writings and memoirs disclose that apart from its inquiry into the crisis, it also makes thoughtful recommendations about the defense of the country as a whole. The Commission again interviewed 73 bureaucrats and top military officers and submitted its supplementary report in November In the paragraphs that follow, we intend briefly to summarise our conclusions on these major aspects of the causes of surrender in East Pakistan, making reference, wherever necessary, to the conclusions already embodied in the Main Report.
Substance of Evidence 9. Farman Ali, as Advisor to the Governor, became responsible for this amount.
Rahmna I of the supplementary report discussed political events ofmilitary aspect, surrender in East Pakistan and the moral aspect. Jamshed Khan, was also reported to have been involved in the misappropriation of currency.
Retrieved 26 August Farman Ali Witness No. There was a general feeling of hatred against Bengalis amongst the soldiers and erport including Generals. Views Read Edit View history. As no such procedure was adopted, it led to a general feeling among the troops, including their officers that they were entitled to take whatever they wanted from wherever they liked.
Niazi, identified as one of the villains of the piece by the HRC, has offered himself up for court martial, declaring that the debacle in the east arose from the failure of the army to hold its ground in the west. This is simply criminal. Several civilian officers have also deposed in a similar vein, and it would suffice to quote here the words of Mr. Yahya Khan was pretending to hold during this period with Sk.
The remarks made by this last witness are commisxion significant: Gen Rtd Altaf Qadir and Mr. This officer remained in East Pakistan continuously from the 28th of February to the 16th of December On his own estimate, he had 26, men at Dacca in uniform and he could have held out for at least another 2 weeks, because the enemy would have taken a week to build up its forces in the Dacca area and another week to reduce the fortress of Dacca.